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Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which stimulation in one sensory modality triggers
involuntary experiences typically not associated with that stimulation. Inducing stimuli
(inducers) and synesthetic experiences (concurrents) may occur within the same modality
(e.g., seeing colors while reading achromatic text) or span across different modalities (e.g.,
tasting ﬂavors while listening to music). Although there has been considerable progress
over the last decade in understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms of synesthesia,
the focus of current neurocognitive models of synesthesia does not encompass many cru-
cial psychophysical characteristics documented in behavioral research. Prominent theories
of the neurophysiological basis of synesthesia construe it as a perceptual phenomenon
and hence focus primarily on the modality-speciﬁc brain regions for perception. Many
behavioral studies, however, suggest an essential role for conceptual-level information in
synesthesia. For example, there is evidence that synesthetic experience arises subsequent
to identiﬁcation of an inducing stimulus, differs substantially from real perceptual events,
can be akin to perceptual memory, and is susceptible to lexical/semantic contexts. These
data suggest that neural mechanisms lying beyond the realm of the perceptual cortex
(especially the visual system), such as regions subserving conceptual knowledge, may play
pivotal roles in the neural architecture of synesthesia. Here we discuss the signiﬁcance of
non-perceptual mechanisms that call for a re-evaluation of the emphasis on synesthesia
as a perceptual phenomenon. We also review recent studies which hint that some
aspects of synesthesia resemble our general conceptual knowledge for object attributes,
at both psychophysical and neural levels. We then present a conceptual-mediation model
of synesthesia in which the inducer and concurrent are linked within a conceptual-level
representation. This “inducer-to-concurrent” nexus is maintained within a supramodal
“hub,” while the subjective (bodily) experience of its resultant concurrent (e.g., a color) may
then require activation of “spokes” in the perception-related cortices. This hypothesized
“hub-and-spoke” structure would engage a distributed network of cortical regions and may
account for the full breadth of this intriguing phenomenon.
Keywords: synesthesia, multisensory integration, attention, color memory, object knowledge
INTRODUCTION
Although subjective experiences (qualia) vary across individuals,
the majority of people seem to perceive the world in a similar way,
providing a commonground for communication. For example,we
can stand together overlooking the ocean and agree that the water
appears to be a shade of blue, we can discuss elements of a lawn
being green andbrown, and so on. For individualswith synesthesia,
however, the experience of the environment can be quite different
from the rest of us. A synesthete may experience the ﬂavors of dif-
ferent food when reading words in a sentence, or different colors
when thinking of the letters of the alphabet. The triggering stim-
ulus (inducer) and resultant experience (concurrent) can be in
different sensory modalities (e.g., listening to music elicits a taste),
or within the same modality (e.g., reading achromatic text elicits
colors associated with each word or letter). Estimates of the preva-
lence of synesthesia vary considerably, depending on the deﬁnition
of synesthesia and the sampling method. If we look speciﬁcally at
grapheme–color synesthesia (graphemic stimuli, such as letters,
digits, the names of days or months and other words, trigger col-
ors), estimates vary between∼0.08%(Rich et al., 2005) and∼2.8%
of the general population (Simner et al., 2006; Banissy et al., 2009).
Simner et al. (2006) deﬁne day-color synesthesia differently from
grapheme–color synesthesia, and estimate it occurs in up to 4%
of the population, whereas Rich et al. (2005) consider individu-
als with only colored days as having a variant of grapheme–color
synesthesia. Other types of synesthesia (e.g.,music induces colors)
are less common than grapheme–color synesthesia (for discus-
sion, see Ward, 2013). Synesthesia has become a “hot topic” in
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cognitive neuroscience. Although there is an intrinsic fascination
with phenomena that reﬂect extraordinary subjective experiences,
this focus on synesthesia also reﬂects the potential that synesthesia
has to provide insights into “normal” mechanisms of cognition
and perception.
The primary questions addressed by synesthesia research to
date are the level at which an inducer has to be processed for synes-
thesia to be elicited, and the relationship of synesthetic colors to the
“real” colors triggered by wavelengths of light, with neuroimaging
studies particularly focusing on the involvement of color-selective
regions of the brain (V4). In the present disquisition, we develop
the idea that synesthesiamay represent an anomaly of object knowl-
edge, akin to knowing a banana is yellow. Our starting point is the
growing evidence that conceptual-level information is critical for
synesthesia to arise and that synesthetic colors may more closely
resemble color memory than color perception.
We ﬁrst examine some inﬂuential claims that synesthetic col-
ors are the same as the color experiences induced by wavelengths
of light (henceforth “real” or “actual” colors). These studies are
often interpreted as demonstrating that synesthesia is a “genuinely
perceptual” phenomenon. We clarify the relationship between
these behavioral data and the dominant neurocognitive mod-
els in the ﬁeld, with a scrutiny on some crucial aspects of the
data that are not taken into account in the major models. We
then review recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies that sug-
gest conceptual knowledge is pivotal in our understanding of
synesthesia. In particular, these data demonstrate that synesthe-
sia and our general conceptual knowledge of object attributes
show similar psychophysical characteristics and may recruit com-
mon neural mechanisms. Finally, building upon the literature
of “ideasthesia” (i.e., synesthetic experience with its roots in
ideas or concepts; see Jürgens and Nikolic´, 2012), we propose
a conceptualization of synesthesia as a benign anomaly of the
general mechanisms for representing object concepts. Incorpo-
rating the current understanding of semantic memory and its
neural substrates, this framework explains many contemporary
ﬁndings in the ﬁeld and provides testable hypotheses for future
work.
PART 1: CONTROVERSIES OVER THE MECHANISMS
UNDERLYING SYNESTHESIA
There are two dominant proposals regarding the neurophysiolog-
ical basis of synesthesia. The disinhibited feedback theory suggests
that synesthesia results from a “glitch” of the inhibitory circuitry
that fails to suppress crosstalk between brain areas, which is
normally inhibited in the non-synesthetic brain. According to dif-
ferent versions of this view, the disinhibition may occur in the
feedback from multi-modal regions (e.g., superior temporal sul-
cus; Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001) or from areas involved
in executive control (e.g., prefrontal cortex; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2009) to unimodal sensory areas. Some early evidence show-
ing synesthesia-like experience elicited by hallucinogens has been
interpreted in favor of this hypothesis such that the drug sti-
ﬂes normal inhibitory neural mechanisms (Grossenbacher and
Lovelace, 2001). More recently, Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009) used
hypnosis to elicit synesthesia-like experiences in individuals with-
out synesthesia. They hypnotized four non-synesthetes and gave
them associations between colors and numbers. These partici-
pants were then given post-hypnotic suggestions and performed
a visual detection task designed by Smilek et al. (2001). Results
showed that hypnotically induced “colors” affected detection of
digits. Cohen Kadosh et al. (2009) argue that hypnosis mitigates
inhibitory mechanisms, hence allowing a temporary emergence
of synesthesia. This intriguing result needs to be considered
with a few caveats. First, although there is evidence showing
that hypnosis leads to a reduction in regional activation levels
of the anterior cingulate cortex (Rainville et al., 2002), it is still
unclear how such modulation occurs at the neuronal “excitation
vs. inhibition” level. By the same token, the behavioral effect of
hypnosis, albeit curious, does not clearly demonstrate alteration
in inhibitory circuitries. Second, the induced effect in the hypno-
tized participants was much larger than that reported by Smilek
et al. (2001) in a single synesthete (discussed in more detail in
the later Section “Does Synesthesia Depend on Identiﬁcation of
Inducing Stimuli?”), raising the concern that the effectsmay not be
analogous. At this point, therefore, the disinhibited feedback the-
ory remains a plausible mechanism for synesthesia yet lacks direct
evidence.
The other dominant view, the cross-activation theory, suggests
that excessive neural connections between cortical areas under-
lie synesthetic experiences. In the seminal version of this theory,
Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001b) proposed that synesthesia
arises fromdirect cross-wiring of neural tracts between the adjoin-
ing areas processing inducers and concurrents. Grapheme–color
synesthesia, then, would occur due to the grapheme area directly
triggering activation of color area V4 via anomalous connectiv-
ity. A revision of this original hypothesis, which acknowledges
the contribution of attention in binding color and visual word
form, is the two-stage cascaded cross-tuning model (Hubbard,
2007; Brang et al., 2010; Hubbard et al., 2011). The major change
is that although the anomalous color is initially generated via cross-
activation between the grapheme area and V4, this “feature” still
needs subsequent binding to create a uniﬁed percept. This bind-
ing is proposed to occur at a later stage, mediated by attentional
mechanisms of the parietal lobe. This two-stage processing was
proposed primarily to explain the mechanisms of grapheme–color
synesthesia, but has recently been extended to account for other
forms of synesthesia (Hubbard et al., 2011). A similar proposal
to the cross-activation model is the re-entrant processing model
(Smilek et al., 2001). In addition to “cross-talk” between relevant
brain areas (e.g., areas processing form and color), this proposal
includes feedback from higher-level areas (such as the anterior
inferior temporal lobe) that represent the concept or meaning of
the inducer (Smilek et al., 2001; Hubbard et al., 2011). This ver-
sion of the cross-activation hypothesis has received less attention
to date, but serves as a starting point for our discussion of the
potential for higher-level areas to link inducers and concurrents.
The emphasis in the two dominant theories has verymuch been
on the perceptual side of the system. This is also reﬂected in the
primary focus of many neuroimaging studies of synesthesia: many
studies have been designed to test whether synesthetic color is
handled by a color-selective section of the fusiform gyrus (i.e.,V4),
with inconsistent results. Some studies ﬁnd that synesthetic color
correlates with V4 activation in some synesthetes and interpret
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this as synesthetic experiences resembling actual perceptual events
(e.g., Hubbard et al., 2005; Sperling et al., 2006), whereas other
studies fail to ﬁnd a V4 response to synesthetic color (e.g., Rich
et al., 2006; Hupé et al., 2012; Sinke et al., 2012b). There is also
inconsistency between behavioral studies, with some claiming that
synesthetic color behaves just like real color (e.g., Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001a; Kim et al., 2006) and others discovering clear
differences between the two types of colors (e.g., Edquist et al.,
2006; Hong and Blake, 2008; Arnold et al., 2012). We review the
relevant behavioral and neuroimaging studies that contribute to
this debate in the following sections.
Most of the evidence reviewed here is based on grapheme–
color synesthesia, due to it being the most widely-studied form
(Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2006; Novich et al., 2011). We
do not, as yet, have a good basis for determining the likelihood
that different forms of synesthesia differ fundamentally in their
underlying mechanisms, but here we attempt to conceptualize a
general form of the phenomena.
DOES SYNESTHESIA DEPEND ON IDENTIFICATION OF INDUCING
STIMULI?
One of the key issues in gauging the role conceptual process-
ing has in synesthesia is to determine how “deeply” an inducer
needs to be processed for synesthesia to arise. If synesthesia is
triggered by “low-level” physical features (e.g., Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001b), changing the appearance of an inducer
should result in alteration of synesthetic percepts. If, in con-
trast, it is the meaning or the concept that elicits synesthesia,
any stimulus that is identiﬁed as a particular inducer (e.g., A,
a, and index the same concept) should elicit the same color.
Subjective reports are mixed on which of these descriptions is
accurate.
Rich et al. (2005) reported, based on questionnaire responses
from 150 grapheme–color synesthetes, that the anomalous color
experiences typically occur regardless of the modality of the
inducer (seen, heard, or even just thought about). Moreover,
changes in the appearance of an inducer (font, size, etc.) were only
occasionally reported to impact on synesthetic color, suggesting
it may be the lexical representation triggering color experiences
rather than the physical appearance. In addition, the semantic
context of an item has a strong effect on the perceived color: an
identical stimulus is reported to elicit different colors depending
whether it is interpreted as a digit or a letter under different con-
texts (e.g., 8o vs. go; Myles et al., 2003; also see Dixon et al., 2006).
By contrast, other synesthetes have reported subtle differences in
the saturation of color for different fonts or cases (e.g., E vs. E or
A vs. a; see Witthoft and Winawer, 2006) or only have synesthesia
for visually presented but not spoken letters (Arnold et al., 2012).
In our large-scale surveys, however, this occurs for a very small
proportion of synesthetes, as is also reported by Simner (2012).
In general, for the majority of synesthetes, it is the concept of
a letter that determines the color rather than its low-level visual
characteristics.
Dixon et al. (2000) objectively veriﬁed that synesthesia could
be elicited by the concept of an inducer. They presented a digit
(e.g., 4), an operator (e.g., +), a second digit (e.g., 3), and
ﬁnally a color patch. They had a synesthete, “C,” name the color
patch as quickly as possible, and then report the solution to the
arithmetic problem. C showed a reliable congruency effect – her
naming times were slower when the display color of the tar-
get patch was incongruent with the synesthetic color induced by
the arithmetic solution, compared to when they were congru-
ent. This indicates that synesthetic color can be triggered by a
mental concept, without the inducing stimulus being physically
present.
In a subsequent study by the same research team, Smilek et al.
(2001) brieﬂy presented a black digit on a colored background
that either matched or mismatched C’s synesthetic color for the
digit. C was poorer at identifying the digit when it was presented
on a congruently colored background relative to an incongru-
ent one, as if it was camouﬂaged by the background color. Some
aspects of these data are puzzling. For example, if the digit could be
effectively concealed by the synesthetic color matching the display
background color, C should perform worse than non-synesthetic
controls. However, C’s performance in the congruent condition
was actually comparable to controls; her performance was just
better than controls in the incongruent condition. Based on their
data, Smilek et al. (2001) propose that synesthesia arises when the
concept/meaning of an inducer is activated but does not require
conscious identiﬁcation.
In contrast to the results of Smilek et al. (2001),Mattingley et al.
(2001) found that synesthesia depended critically on conscious
identiﬁcation of the inducer. They presented 15 synesthetes with
a variant of a synesthetic congruency task (Wollen and Ruggiero,
1983) in which the synesthetic color elicited by a letter inducer
prime was either congruent or incongruent with a succeeding tar-
get color to be named. They showed a robust synesthetic priming
effect from the letter prime on subsequent color naming times
when the primewas clearly visible. This priming effect disappeared
when the inducer prime was rendered invisible by a backward
mask. The unseen primes still elicited a priming effect on a letter
naming task, indicating some unconscious processing of the let-
ter, at least to the level of orthographic representation. Mattingley
et al. (2001) interpreted these results as synesthetic color only aris-
ing when the inducer is consciously identiﬁed. Later ﬁndings have
been consistent with this claim, demonstrating that synesthetic
congruency effects can be abolishedwhen attentional resources are
not sufﬁcient for conscious report of a letter, such as in the middle
of the attentional blink (Rich and Mattingley, 2010). Concur-
rently, other studies have demonstrated that reducing attentional
resources available for processing the inducer (presumably ham-
pering identiﬁcation) attenuates the otherwise reliable impact of
synesthetic color on color naming (Rich and Mattingley, 2003;
Mattingley et al., 2006; Sagiv et al., 2006).
The studies reviewed above suggest that access to the concep-
tual representation of an inducer plays a critical role in eliciting
synesthesia. However, the extent to which meaning without full
conscious identiﬁcation can elicit synesthesia is unclear. Smilek
et al. (2001) emphasize that access to the concept/meaning of
the inducer should be sufﬁcient to trigger synesthetic colors.
Access to lexical or pictorial meaning can occur prior to identi-
ﬁcation, leading to masked priming effects (e.g., Dell’Acqua and
Grainger, 1999). In synesthesia, however, the masked priming data
(Mattingley et al., 2001) suggest that implicit processing without
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conscious identiﬁcation is not enough to elicit synesthesia (at
least, not sufﬁcient to cause a reliably detectable synesthetic con-
gruency effect). Thus, it seems clear that access to a concept is
important, and that the depth of processing needs to be consider-
able (probably to full conscious identiﬁcation) before synesthesia
arises.
IS SYNESTHETIC COLOR EQUIVALENT TO REAL COLOR?
Another major focus of synesthesia research has been whether
induced synesthetic color is equivalent to “real” color. Subjective
reports again provide mixed information about this. On the one
hand, synesthetes sometimes report that their synesthetic colors
can be as conspicuous as real colors (Ramachandran and Hub-
bard, 2001a,b), and on the other hand, they can clearly distinguish
synesthetic colors from the actual colors of triggering graphemes.
Despite some inﬂuential claims in early studies, objective data
are generally consistent in demonstrating a difference between
synesthetic and real colors.
In an inﬂuential study, Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001a)
demonstrated that synesthetic color facilitated visual search – a
unique synesthetic color caused an obscure shape to “pop out”
from surrounding items of a visual display. It is well-established
that actual color causes “pop-out” during visual search: when a
target has a unique color, the number of distractors has minimal
effect on the reaction time (RT) to detect the target (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980). This efﬁcient search usually leads to a shallow
or ﬂat search slope of the RT by set-size function, demonstrating
that color is registered rapidly into its sensory channels and can
be effectively used to guide attention. In their well-known synes-
thetic “pop-out” study, Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001a) had
two synesthetes search through an array of black digits for an
embedded contour composed of identical digits. Compared to
non-synesthetic controls, the synesthetes were more accurate in
identifying the embedded target (controls: 59.40%; synesthetes:
81.25%; chance level was 25%). In a later paper (Ramachandran
and Hubbard, 2001b), the authors interpreted this result as synes-
thetic color “popping out” like real color and facilitating visual
search.
A synesthetic pop-out effectwould be provocative, as it conﬂicts
withwhat is known about the role of attention in letter recognition
(e.g., Mackeben, 1999), and indeed, with our claim that synes-
thetic color arises after attentional processing of the inducer (e.g.,
Mattingley et al., 2006; Rich and Mattingley, 2010). Subsequent
visual search studies, however, found that although synesthetic
color occasionally bestows an advantage during visual search, it
does not lead to the pop-out effect. Palmeri et al. (2002) found
a synesthete outperformed controls during a traditional visual
search task with a single target among multiple homogeneous dis-
tractors. However, the slope of the RT by set-size function was
much steeper than the typical ﬂat slope of the pop-out effect.
Moreover, the effect only occurred when the distractors elicited
synesthesia, making it clear the effect was not related to the synes-
thetic color of the target. Edquist et al. (2006) and Sagiv et al.
(2006) also had synesthetes perform visual search tasks. In nei-
ther study (sample size: 14 synesthetes by Edquist et al., 2006 and
2 synesthetes by Sagiv et al., 2006) was there any evidence of a
synesthetic advantage over non-synesthetic controls. Whereas a
unique chromatic letter was immediately manifest, an achromatic
letter could only be found via an effortful search that did not dif-
fer from controls, indicating no synesthetic pop-out. Laeng et al.
(2004) also tested a synesthete using a visual search task. Initially,
these authors found that synesthesia could lead to an advantage,
but only when the target was within the central focus of attention.
A later study by Laeng (2009) suggested that pop-out could occur
if the target and distractor letters were carefully chosen to elicit
colors far distant in color space. This remains the only case to date
that resembles a truly efﬁcient search function.
Returning to the embedded ﬁgures task, Ward et al. (2010)
tested 36 synesthetes and 36 controls and recorded synes-
thetes’ trial-by-trial descriptions of their synesthetic experiences.
They observed a general superiority of synesthetes in accuracy
(synesthetes: 41.4%; controls: 31.5%), replicating the original
Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001a) case-study results, albeit
with a smaller (∼10%) advantage for synesthetes. However, most
of their synesthetes reported no color experience during search,
and synesthetic color only seemed to emerge when a letter was
attended. They concluded this was inconsistent with “pop-out,”
based on the subjective reports and the fact that the accuracy
advantage for synesthetes was far less than one would expect
from actually colored stimuli. Rich and Karstoft (2013) modi-
ﬁed the embedded ﬁgure task to manipulate set-size, allowing a
direct objective test of the pop-out hypothesis. With eight synes-
thetes and eight matched controls, they replicated the advantage
for synesthetes over controls in accuracy at the largest set-size
(64 items; synesthetes: 1.87% errors; controls: 11.56% errors) but
found no differences in RTs/search slopes that would be indica-
tive of a synesthetic “pop-out” effect. At this point, despite subtle
advantages in some visual search studies for some synesthetes,
there is little evidence that synesthetic color pops out like real
color.
There are alternative explanations to explain the occasional
advantage of synesthetes in visual search-type tasks. For exam-
ple, Mattingley (2009) raised a possibility that synesthetic color
may facilitate the grouping of items and conﬁne search scope (also
see Ward et al., 2010; Rich and Karstoft, 2013 for discussion of the
grouping account). In addition, a recent study (Rappaport et al.,
2013) reported that coloring an object with its familiar color (e.g.,
yellow corn) led tomore efﬁcient visual search (slope: 10ms/item),
compared to it being in an atypical color (22 ms/item). Note that
the facilitation by color familiarity/memory is still inferior to pop-
out searches for real color,whichoften gives slopes close to 0 (Wolfe
and Horowitz, 2004). Such ﬁndings resemble the pattern seen in
synesthetic color improving visual search, implying that the facil-
itation originates from well-learnt conjunctive representations, be
it synesthetic or ordinary mnemonic, reducing attentional con-
straints but causing no pop-out. Furthermore, as we will discuss
later, the resemblance raises the hypothesis that the human brain
employs the same mechanisms to represent synesthetic color and
the knowledge about canonical object color.
Other studies using psychophysicalmeasures of low-level visual
properties also suggest that synesthetic color is distinct from real
color. For example, synesthetic color does not induce chromatic
adaptation (Hong and Blake, 2008), the simultaneous color con-
trast effect (Nijboer et al., 2011a), or the color constancy effect
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(Erskine et al., 2012). Although there are some claims that synes-
thetic color behaves like actual color to affect bistable apparent
motion (Kim et al., 2006) and to induce the watercolor illusion
(Kim and Blake, 2005), these studies tested only two synesthetes
and used designs that are not criterion-free. For instance, Kim
et al. (2006) asked the synesthetes to decide whether two alternat-
ing visual arrays of letters appeared to move leftward or rightward
and found that letters that induced the same color tended to be
“grouped” together, which biased motion trajectory of the arrays.
However, the need to select between two alternatives could result
in an effect that simply reﬂects the tendency to use color similarity
to guide a decision. With this design, there is no way of telling
whether synesthetic color truly biases perception or simply the
decisional criterion. Overall, there are clear differences between
synesthetic color and real color, suggesting there must be crucial
differences in the mechanisms that underpin the two forms of
color experiences.
CONTROVERSIES OVER THE CATEGORIZATION OF SYNESTHETES
One explanation for the discrepant results regarding how closely
synesthetic color resembles real color is that different mecha-
nisms underpin synesthesia for different sub-groups, and, for
at least some synesthetes, their evoked colors are akin to “real”
colors. Dixon et al. (2004) distinguish “projectors,” who describe
synesthetic color as appearing “out in space,” from “associators,”
who describe the color as “in the mind’s eye.” They suggest
that, compared to associators, the synesthetic color of projec-
tors emerges earlier in the visual system. In another proposal,
Ramachandran andHubbard (2001b) differentiate between“lower
synesthetes,” for whom synesthesia is induced by sensory stimu-
lation, and “higher synesthetes,” for whom it is caused by the
meaning of the inducer. In lower synesthetes, the cross-wiring
between the grapheme area and the color center (V4) is assumed
to generate their synesthetic color whereas, in higher synes-
thetes, the wiring to the parietal lobe produces the anomalous
color. These categorizations were originally proposed to reconcile
contradictory results. However, they have now generated more
debate.
Dixon et al. (2004) tested whether they could objectively dis-
tinguish “projectors” from “associators” using two versions of the
synesthetic congruency task – naming the physical color of a letter
or naming its synesthetic color. The display color and the synes-
thetic color on a given trial could either match (congruent) or
conﬂict (incongruent). Their synesthetes were ﬁrst separated by
subjective report (seven associators and ﬁve projectors). Results
showed that those classiﬁed as projectors had a larger congruency
effect (incongruent minus congruent RT) when naming displayed
color than synesthetic color, whereas associators showed the oppo-
site pattern (see Ward et al., 2007 for similar demonstrations with
seven associators and seven projectors). However, other studies
have failed to ﬁnd differences between subjectively classiﬁed pro-
jectors and associators on visual search tasks. For example, Edquist
et al. (2006) tested 14 synesthetes and found that their anoma-
lous colors did not affect performance on a visual search task,
regardless of whether the synesthete identiﬁed his/herself as an
associator or a projector (based on initial responses to just the
question of whether the color appeared “out in space” vs. “in my
mind’s eye,” there were ﬁve projectors, seven associators, and two
subjects who reported that neither of these ﬁtted their experiences;
also see below for the variation of reports across time). Sagiv et al.
(2006) also tested two self-reported projectors on a visual search
task and found no advantage from synesthetic colors. In a more
recent study with a large sample size (27 associators and 9 projec-
tors, classiﬁed based on responses to questionnaires), Ward et al.
(2010) also failed to ﬁnd any difference between the two types of
synesthetes on a visual search task. As a ﬁnal example, Nijboer
et al. (2011b; also see Nijboer and Van der Stigchel, 2009) asked
nine synesthetes (six associators and three projectors) to execute
an eye movement to a target digit during visual search. The results
showed that a target that usually elicited a synesthetic color did
not lead to the pop-out effect (indexed by faster saccadic onset)
in either the associators or the projectors. One further issue with
this dichotomy is that the subjective reports of “in the mind’s eye”
vs. “out in space” may be unreliable, switching from one descrip-
tion to the other between two points in time (Edquist et al., 2006).
This variability presumably reﬂects the difﬁculty in using language
to describe the subjective experience. Thus, although it is always
possible that for some synesthetic individuals synesthetic colors do
behave like real colors, there is little evidence of reliable behavioral
differences at this point.
Some neuroimaging studies have claimed to lend support to the
“associator vs. projector” distinction. Rouw and Scholte (2010)
used voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to compare the volume
and density of neuronal gray matter (GM) between 16 projectors
and 26 associators, compared with 42 non-synesthetic controls.
They also used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
look at the functional response to graphemes (contrasting color-
inducing graphemes vs. non-inducing symbols), relative to 19
non-synesthetic controls. Synesthetes were classiﬁed as projectors
and associators based on their scores on a questionnaire prob-
ing the subjective locus of their synesthetic colors. In structural
measures, projectors had increased GM in the cortical areas for
perception and action (i.e., the visual cortex and other sensori-
motor areas), whereas associators had more GM in the regions
involved in memory encoding and retrieval (i.e., the hippocam-
pus and parahippocampal gyri). Their fMRI data also revealed
that, compared to projectors, associators showed greater activity
in the bilateral parahippocampal gyri, which mapped to the same
regions that showed structural alternation in the VBM analyses.
The authors suggest that such neuroanatomical differences drive
the individual variability in the subjective locus of synesthetic color
(internal “in the mind’s eye” vs. external “out in space”). Although
this inference is intriguing, others have raised concerns about the
stringency of the analyses. Hupé et al. (2012) note that it is not
clear whether Rouw and Scholte (2007, 2010) applied correction
for multiple comparisons to data over the whole brain and suggest
that not including brain size as a covariate can be problematic. In
addition to the question about whether the analyses have enough
rigor, there is conﬂicting evidence regarding the “distribution” of
the two hypothesized forms of synesthetes: in an earlier study by
the same authors, Rouw and Scholte (2007) tested 18 synesthetes
and found their scores on the “associator vs. projector” dimension
appeared more evenly distributed along the spectrum and formed
a positive correlation with the fractional anisotropy (an index of
www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 105 | 5
Chiou and Rich The role of conceptual knowledge in synesthesia
ﬁber density or directional coherence in white matter tracts) of
the right temporal cortex, implying the variability is continuous
(also see Eagleman, 2012). In their later study (Rouw and Scholte,
2010), which included these 18 synesthetes in a ﬁnal sample of 42,
the distribution of self-reports looked more bi-modal rather than
falling along a continuum. The Rouw and Scholte (2010) paper
remains the most comprehensive imaging paper in synesthesia
research to date. Other neuroimaging studies using fMRI (van
Leeuwen et al., 2010)1 and electroencephalography (EEG; Gebuis
et al., 2009) have failed to ﬁnd reliable differences between asso-
ciators and projectors in regional haemodynamic responses and
electrophysiological waveforms. Overall, we tend to agree with
Eagleman (2012) that it is difﬁcult to know whether we are look-
ing at the extremes of a continuum or a categorical distinction
between two groups differing fundamentally in the spatial frame
of their synesthetic colors.
Compared to the “projector vs. association” distinction, there
is less empirical data on the “lower vs. higher” categorization
of synesthetes. Hubbard et al. (2005) emphasized the potential
importance of individual differences in their fMRI study. They
tested six synesthetes using their embedded ﬁgures task (discussed
previously) and a crowding task. In the latter task, participants
had to identify a target letter ﬂanked by distractors in the visual
periphery, with all stimuli being achromatic. Identifying the tar-
get was difﬁcult as distractors “crowded” the target, rendering
it unrecognizable. In the embedded ﬁgures task, ﬁve of the six
synesthetes performed better than their controls in their accuracy
of identifying the embedded shape. For the crowding task, three
of the six synesthetes had a slight advantage over their controls
in correctly identifying targets, which the authors interpreted as
synesthetic color mitigating visual crowding (note that no differ-
ence was found at the group level). The authors then examined the
response of visual cortical regions in synesthetes and controls pre-
sented with achromatic graphemes. They reported signiﬁcantly
higher V4 activation in synesthetes than controls (albeit with a
liberal statistical approach, a one-tailed test that assumes a pri-
ori higher V4 activity in synesthetes than controls; see Hupé et al.,
2012). Further, the authors found a signiﬁcant correlation between
performance on the crowding task and the strength of V4 activity
such that synesthetes with greater V4 activation tended to per-
form better on the visual crowding task. The authors propose that
individual differences in the ability to perform the crowding task
map onto the “lower” (better performance, more V4 activity) vs.
“higher” (average performance, less V4 activity) synesthete dis-
tinction2. As they note, however, it is not possible with such a
small sample size to distinguish sub-groups from polar extremes
of a continuum.
1van Leeuwen et al. (2010) categorized 21 synesthetes into associators or projectors
using a questionnaire. In their fMRI experiments, none of their region of inter-
est analyses revealed a reliable difference between the two groups. Although they
reported associators showed “marginally” higher (p = 0.09) activation in a left pari-
etal lobule cluster than did projectors, these effects appeared rather weak as they
were obtained using planned tests (due to null results of their main analyses) with
liberal criteria (i.e., α = 0.05, not corrected for multiple comparisons).
2Although Hubbard et al. (2005) draw a parallel between their“higher/lower”synes-
thetes and the “associator/projector” distinction discussed previously, Ward et al.
(2007) later found these categorizations to be orthogonal.
There is a general consensus among researchers that the salience
or intensity of synesthetic experience varies between individuals.
The challenge lies in ﬁnding whether this variation truly indicates
fundamental differences, perhaps qualitatively involving distinct
neural mechanisms, such that we should categorize synesthetes
into sub-groups, or whether it reﬂects individual variability within
the same basic mechanism.
DEBATES CONCERNING THE NEURAL BASIS OF SYNESTHESIA
The notion that there must be a difference in neuronal “wiring”
between synesthetes and non-synesthetes has been popular among
scientists and the general public alike. As discussed earlier, the dis-
inhibited feedback theory suggests that synesthesia results from
a deﬁciency of inter-neuronal inhibition. The evidence for this
theory (e.g., synesthesia-like experience elicited by drug or hyp-
nosis) is all behavioral and does not provide direct support for the
existence of malfunctioning neuronal inhibition. Further, a recent
paper systematically compareddevelopmental synesthesia todrug-
induced similar experiences and found that the two have more dif-
ferences than commonalities (Sinke et al., 2012a). Neuroimaging
studies have provided more direct examination of the predictions
of the cross-activation theory. In the case of grapheme–color synes-
thesia, the cross-activation view assumes that synesthetic color is
ﬁrst induced by the grapheme area directly triggering activation
in V4, the specialized area for processing color; at a subsequent
stage, the attentional mechanisms mediated by the parietal lobe
act as “glue” to combine synesthetic color with visual word form.
Although the involvement of the parietal lobe in synesthesia is
generally agreed upon amongst researchers, there is debate about
the ﬁrst hypothesized stage. There are two principle points of
contention.
The ﬁrst issue with the cross-activation theory is that there is
still debate about whether the human brain really hosts a cortical
region specialized for processing visual word form. Reading text
activates the left lateral occipitotemporal sulcus/the left fusiform
gyrus, a site often referred to as the visual word form area (VWFA;
see Cohen et al., 2002; McCandliss et al., 2003). This site is reliably
activated by graphemic stimuli, regardless of different scripts or
languages. Moreover, brain lesions of theVWFA cause pure alexia,
a selective deﬁcit in word recognition (Cohen et al., 2000). Such
evidence has led to the theory that this left ventral occipitotem-
poral section of the brain is specialized for conjoining graphemic
features into a word shape, prior to the stimulus accessing its
phonological and semantic codes (Dehaene and Cohen, 2011).
However, the speciﬁcity of this area to graphemic processing has
been challenged. For instance, Price and Devlin (2003) found that
this “visual word form” area could also be activated by images
of animals and vehicles. Devlin et al. (2006) also found that this
area responded to the semantic relations between words, suggest-
ing that it does not exclusively represent visual word form. Two
recent studies explored the functionally connectivity of theVWFA
(Vogel et al., 2012a) and contrasted its response to words and line
drawings (Vogel et al., 2012b). Results showed that the activity of
this region did not functionally co-vary with other reading-related
regions and showed no preferential response to words, which the
authors interpret as evidence that it is amore general visual proces-
sor used in reading but also in other visual tasks. Given the debate,
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it may be premature to conclude the putative contribution of this
region to synesthesia is, as the cross-activation view assumes, the
visual analysis of graphemic components. It is possible it reﬂects
non-perceptual processing, such as the semantic representation of
a stimulus.
The second, perhaps more problematic, issue for the cross-
activation account is whether synesthetic color recruits V4. Some
studies have observedV4 activation when synesthetes view or hear
graphemes (Nunn et al., 2002; Hubbard et al., 2005; Sperling et al.,
2006). However, other studies did not ﬁnd V4 activation during
synesthesia (Rich et al., 2006; Hupé et al., 2012; Sinke et al., 2012b).
Hupé et al. (2012) conducted a thorough review of the literature
to assess the origin of these discrepancies; they claim that all imag-
ing studies in synesthesia that report V4 activation in synesthesia
use overly liberal statistical criteria. In the study by Nunn et al.
(2002), the areas activated by synesthetic color did not actually
overlap with those by real color. In the study of Sperling et al.
(2006), there was no correction for multiple comparisons for sta-
tistical tests; despite this liberal criterion, they foundV4 activity in
only two out of four synesthetes. Finally, in Hubbard et al. (2005),
the criterion was also liberal (one-tailed tests assuming higher
V4 activation in synesthetes than in controls). Of course, these
statistical issues are not limited to studies reporting V4 activa-
tion, but the Hupé et al. (2012) critique emphasizes the potential
for such analysis decisions to lead to a misperception of the
robustness of such ﬁndings. It is therefore by no means unequiv-
ocal from the data presented to date that synesthetic color
activates V4.
In addition to the issue of overly liberal statistical criterion,
Mattingley (2009) speculates that the greater V4 activation in
synesthetes in some studiesmaybe confoundedbymental imagery.
Various lines of inquiry seem to give credence to this suggestion.
Barnett and Newell (2008) reported that synesthetes (n = 38)
scored higher than controls on the Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ), a test probing the vividness of their visual
imagery. Although this merely suggests that synesthetes may have
more vivid imagery and an inclination to imagine, there are two
pieces of evidence linking this behavioral result to neural pro-
cessing. First, Cui et al. (2007) showed that individuals (n = 8)
who score higher on VVIQ tend to show higher activity in the
early visual cortex (Brodmann’s areas 17 and 18, regions of
interest (ROIs) deﬁned using a neuroanatomical database) when
performing mental imagery. Second, Rich et al. (2006) used a
color perception localizer (colored minus gray-scale Mondrians)
to deﬁne ROIs in the visual cortex responsive to colored stimuli
in seven synesthetes and matched controls. Within these color-
responsive ROIs (voxels passing small volume correction), they
found that voluntary color imagery resulted in activation for both
synesthetes and controls in the fusiform gyrus, a location consis-
tent with the literature deﬁnition of V4. These ﬁndings together
imply that V4 activation in synesthesia studies could potentially
reﬂect synesthetes imagining color, rather than synesthetic color
per se. A recent study lent further support to this imagery explana-
tionofV4 activity: Sinke et al. (2012b) found thatwhen synesthetes
and controls were matched for their scores on VVIQ, there was no
difference in V4 activation between the two groups. That is not
to say that synesthesia is only voluntary imagery, but just that
in a scanning environment where synesthesia is the focus, par-
ticipants who are trying hard might utilize color imagery, which
consequently activates V4. We need more evidence before con-
cluding that synesthesia originates from the cross-wiring between
V4 and grapheme area, and that synesthesia and “real” color share
neural bases.
Thus far, the data we have reviewed shows a discrepancy
between behavioral data and the assumptions made by the
dominant theories about the neural mechanisms of synesthe-
sia. We argue that behavioral evidence suggests that synesthe-
sia is strongly reliant upon and inﬂuenced by the conceptual
representation of inducers and has attributes that are distinct
from those of actual color. The neurocognitive theories of
synesthesia (especially the cross-activation view) focus on the
grapheme area and V4, postulating that synesthesia depends on
the feature-level (lines, intersections, etc.) perceptual processing
of a grapheme and resembles real color. We need a frame-
work for synesthesia that is better able to integrate a broader
gamut of behavioral and neuroimaging ﬁndings. In the follow-
ing section, we expand upon the role conceptual knowledge has in
synesthesia, and propose a conceptual-mediation neurocognitive
framework.
PART 2: THE ROLE OF CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE IN
SYNESTHESIA
As reviewed in Part 1, there is good evidence that substantial
processing of an inducing stimulus, including access to mean-
ing/concept, is necessary to elicit synesthesia (e.g., Dixon et al.,
2000; Mattingley et al., 2001; Rich et al., 2005; Nijboer andVan der
Stigchel, 2009; Rich and Mattingley, 2010; Nijboer et al., 2011b;
Simner, 2012). Research into the nature and effects of synesthetic
experience has also highlighted distinctions between synesthetic
and real colors in terms of their psychophysical characteristics
(e.g., Edquist et al., 2006; Sagiv et al., 2006; Hong and Blake,
2008; Arnold et al., 2012; Erskine et al., 2012). The overall pat-
tern of contemporary ﬁndings suggests a need for a framework
that emphasizes the role of high-level processing in synesthesia,
such as conceptual knowledge.
Figure 1A shows a schematic illustration of our proposed stages
involved in the elicitation of synesthetic color: initially attentive
processing of an inducer leads to perceptual analyses of its phys-
ical attributes (e.g., lines, curves, conjunctions, etc.). A series
of perceptual processes culminates in the identiﬁcation of that
stimulus at a conceptual level, regardless of themodality of presen-
tation. The action of identiﬁcation may differ between stimulus
types (e.g., letter identiﬁcation is individuating the lexical iden-
tity, whereas for a sound there can be the awareness that a sound
has occurred, recognition of instrument or speaker, through to
individuation of that sound with a label, such as middle C or
F-sharp minor). To this point, processing in synesthetes and non-
synesthetes should be identical. Activation of the stimulus concept
spreads through a semantic network: the activation propagates
from the core conceptual representation of the inducer to its
associated nodes of conceptual attributes, which for synesthetes,
includes a link to the concept of a color absent (or weak) in non-
synesthetes. We conceptualize this as a similar linkage to the way
in which the concept of a banana includes its canonical color
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FIGURE 1 | The conceptual-mediation model of synesthesia.
(A) Schematic of the processes involved in the elicitation of lexically
induced synesthetic color experience. In this information processing
stream, attention to the inducer letter “A” serves as the gatekeeper
for subsequent analyses. The perceptual system then analyses how
lines are conjoined, deriving the visual word form of “A.” The visual
representation of “A” subsequently activates the core lexical concept of
“A,” which in turn excites various associated nodes of conceptual
properties in a semantic network, including its red synesthetic color;
(B) a schematic illustration of the semantic network of the concept of
banana and its related conceptual features; (C) the salience/vividness of
synesthetic color may depend on the strength or directness of the link
between the lexical presentation of “A” and its synesthetically red
color.
(Figure 1B). The end-point of this cascade of cognitive processing
is an experience of synesthetic color, with variability in the indi-
vidual experience from a “feeling” of color to a strong “percept”
of color, perhaps depending on the strength and distance of the
connections within the neural network. A strong link bridging the
ensemble of neurons coding lexical meaning in the semantic net-
work to those coding color in the perceptual areas might travel
through the occipitotemporal regions involved in color-related
processes representing memorized and/or perceived color, result-
ing in a vivid percept of color. By contrast, aweaker link connecting
lexical and color representation within the semantic network, or
one that persists only partway down the system toward the per-
ceptual areas, may only give a faint percept or a “feeling” of color
without clear visual components (Figure 1C).
How can this conceptual-mediation model account for the
range of behavioral and neural data? First, the role of attention
is clear. Without attention to an inducer, there is no identiﬁcation,
and therefore the process does not kick off. Second, the abstract
identity of the inducer is linked to its synesthetic color at a concep-
tual level and the processing propagates back down the network
toward more perceptual representations. This framework encom-
passes the top-down effects including semantic context, as well as
allowing for the individual variability in the “percept-like-ness” of
the experience. Finally, as elaborated later, when non-synesthetes
are asked to make voluntary associations between (for example)
sounds and colors, there are systematic patterns that are strik-
ingly similar to those seen in the inducer-concurrent pairings of
synesthetes. There is evidence that these trends of cross-modal
mappings observed in non-synesthete are mediated by semantic
knowledge, again suggesting it may be a groundwork subserving
synesthetic and ordinary phenomena.We propose that synesthesia
has cognitive roots in the semantic knowledge base that we all
share, rather than requiring a fundamentally different neural
network of connections.
One prediction of the conceptual-mediation model is that
synesthetic colors should be more similar to high-level color
knowledge than to perceiving “real” color, because the critical link
occurs between concepts – the link is between, for instance, the
concepts of lexical entity “A” and perceptual property “red.” There
are a few recent studies suggesting that this may indeed be the case.
Results of recent fMRI and brain stimulation studies also hint that
synesthetic color and color knowledgemay recruit commonneural
substrates, beyond the realm of V4. In the following sections, we
review this recent evidence and further discuss the proposal that
synesthesia relies on the cognitive and neural mechanisms of con-
ceptual knowledge.We also outline how this conceptualization can
better explain why non-synesthetes show strikingly similar trends
to the unusual experiences of synesthetes when asked to asso-
ciate graphemes/sounds with visual attributes, and the implicit
cross-modal mappings we all share.
GRAPHEME–COLOR SYNESTHESIA RESEMBLES COLOR
KNOWLEDGE/MEMORY
The conceptual-mediation model predicts that synesthetic colors
should more closely resemble high-level color knowledge, where
color is an intrinsic attribute contributing to the concept of an
object (e.g., knowing a banana is yellow) than low-level color
perception (e.g., perceiving a shade of yellow hue). Nijboer et al.
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(2011a) tested whether synesthetic color could elicit the simulta-
neous color contrast effect, a phenomenon reﬂecting early visual
processing. They presented an achromatic grapheme on a col-
ored background and had 12 synesthetes adjust the color of a
white hash sign to match their synesthetic color. Twelve con-
trols performed the same task with physically colored graphemes
(matched to their synesthetic counterparts). The keymanipulation
was that the background and grapheme could have colors similar
in hue or opponent colors. Controls demonstrated the typical
simultaneous color contrast effect (Valberg and Lange-Malecki,
1990): when the grapheme and background had opponent col-
ors (e.g., a green background and a red grapheme), responses
tended to “offset” the background color. Speciﬁcally, a green
background made a red grapheme seem redder than it actu-
ally was (color contrast), so controls added more red than what
was present in the reference stimulus (i.e., grapheme). Synes-
thetes showed an inverse pattern to that of controls such that
their responses tended to “conform” to the background color.
When a grapheme induced a red synesthetic color appearing on
a green background (opponent colors), synesthetes added insuf-
ﬁcient red to match their synesthetic color. When it was a red
synesthetic color on a red background (similar colors), they added
excessive red.
The absence of the typical color contrast effect from synesthetic
colors concurs with earlier studies that early mechanisms do not
contribute to synesthesia (e.g., Hong and Blake, 2008). However,
it is the reverse pattern of synesthetic colors relative to the typical
effect of real color that raises an interesting possibility: synesthetic
color may be an anomalous case of object color knowledge (e.g.,
knowing that bananas are typically yellow). There is evidence that
color knowledge can affect perceived color appearance (Hansen
et al., 2006), and also that the representation of high-level color
memory is less precise then real color (Knill and Richards, 1996).
Thus, Nijboer et al. (2011a) suggest that, similar to color knowl-
edge, the perceptual representation of synesthetic color may be
less solid and tend to ﬂuctuate more easily than real color. This
difference in perceptual characteristics relative to real color may
lead to synesthetic colors assimilating into the background, result-
ing in the reverse pattern. To explain the potentially pliable nature
of synesthetic color, Nijboer et al. (2011a) drew an analogy to the
impact of perceptual noise on shape perception: when the con-
tour of a stimulus is obscured by noise and becomes less concrete,
shape representation gradually assimilates into the clearly deﬁned
background (Van der Kooij and te Pas, 2009). Although it would
be more cogent to have a direct comparison between synesthetic
colors and general object knowledge with regard to the effect on
perceived color appearance, these data support the notion that
high-level color knowledge could form the basis for synesthetic
colors.
The idea that synesthetic colors may resemble a higher-level
color representation such as color knowledge or color mem-
ory has been directly addressed in another recent study. Arnold
et al. (2012) tested six synesthetes who reported that seeing a
printed grapheme evoked a color experience whereas hearing a
spoken grapheme generated no color. The synesthetic color of
a heard grapheme could nonetheless be retrieved from mem-
ory. Synesthetes adjusted a color patch to match their synesthetic
colors. The graphemes were presented in two different modes
(printed/spoken). Thus, measures of precision (distance in color
coordinates between matched and synesthetic color) could be
derived and compared between when it was online (seen concomi-
tantly with a grapheme) and ofﬂine (recalled from memory when
hearing a grapheme – although note this was based on subjective
report; it would have been ideal to have an objective measure of
the difference in synesthetic colors between the two conditions).
They found the degree of precisionwas comparable between colors
elicited by printed and spoken graphemes, suggesting that synes-
thetic color perceived in real-time is perceptually equivalent to the
color recalled from memory. In a control experiment, the preci-
sion of actual color seen in real-time greatly exceeded that of color
memory. These results indicate that visible real color has a higher
perceptual precision than color memory, consistent with Knill and
Richards (1996). In contrast, synesthetic color, be it seen online or
recalled ofﬂine, is perceptually analogous to color memory.
In sum, although synesthetic color may be as vivid as real color
at the subjective level, recent psychophysical data suggests that it is
akin to reinstatement of perceptual memory. This is a signiﬁcant
step forward in determining the nature of synesthetic experience,
and the level at which the critical representation might occur. Such
effects are consistent with the proposal that the critical process
linking inducers to concurrents is conceptual, rather than entirely
perceptual, in nature.
SYNESTHETES SHOW SIMILAR TRENDS TO NON-SYNESTHETIC
INDIVIDUALS
The comparison between synesthetes and non-synesthetes in their
ways of associating inducing stimuli with perceptual attributes
offers further clues regarding the contribution of conceptual pro-
cessing in mediating synesthesia. In the case of grapheme–color
synesthesia, large-scale studies looking for patterns across synes-
thetes suggest that lexical/semantic knowledge has an important
role in mediating the coupling between lexical stimuli and col-
ors. Rich et al. (2005) found a striking consistency among 150
synesthetes in their synesthetic pairing between graphemes and
colors. For half the letters of the alphabet, certain letter–color pairs
were reported signiﬁcantly more often than would be expected by
chance (e.g., “R” elicited red for 36% of the sample, “Y” elicited
yellow for 45%, “O” elicited white for 56%, “D” elicited brown
for 47%). Interestingly, similar trends were apparent for a group
of non-synesthetic controls who were asked to pair colors with
letters and numbers (i.e., controls reported most of the same
letter–color associations as synesthetes). Simner et al. (2005) also
reported a noticeable similarity between synesthetes and controls
in their grapheme–color associations (e.g., in both groups, “A”
tended to be red, “B” tended to be blue). Both studies suggest that
grapheme–color synesthesia, whilst only manifest in a small per-
centage of the population, stems from mechanisms common to
non-synesthetes, such as similar semantic knowledge or learning
experiences. In non-synesthetes, retrieving this type of weak con-
ceptual link (e.g., associating “A” with red) is a volitional mental
operation. In synesthetes, however, accessing the links from induc-
ers to concurrents is typically involuntary, implying a strong link
between the lexical identity and color as a related attribute of the
concept.
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In addition to the associations between letters and colors,
similarities between synesthetes and non-synesthetes have also
been found in other types of synesthesia. As with grapheme–
color synesthesia, there are hints that the similarities reﬂect
contributions of high-level conceptual knowledge rather than
low-level sensory processing. One example is auditory–visual
synesthesia, a phenomenon where auditory stimuli elicit visual
experiences.
There is good evidence showing systematic trends in the
way synesthetic visual experiences vary with acoustic features
of sounds (e.g., pitch). These patterns are also present in the
implicit mappings seen in non-synesthetes. Ward et al. (2006) had
10 auditory–visual synesthetes select their synesthetic colors in
response to instrument sounds. Ten controls were asked to asso-
ciate colors with the same sounds. Although the color chosen
by synesthetes was more consistent than controls across two rep-
etitions, there was a pattern in both groups: as auditory pitch
got higher, the selected colors gradually became brighter, akin
to the typical pitch–brightness mapping (Marks, 1975). This sys-
tematicity is not limited to the color dimension. We tested seven
synesthetes for whom sounds induced synesthetic visual expe-
riences and, in addition to asking about synesthetic colors, we
documented other non-color features, such as size, shape, and
location of the experience (Chiou et al., 2012). Their synesthetic
experiences in response to instrument notes were usually colored
geometric objects, often with a speciﬁc spatial location (in the
mind’s eye). As illustrated in Figures 2A–C, there were systematic
patterns such that as the auditory pitch got higher, the appear-
ance of synesthetic objects became brighter in color, smaller in
size, and higher in spatial location. This trend closely resembles
the correspondences between auditory pitch and visual features
documented in non-synesthetes (Spence, 2011), which we suggest
implies a common mechanism underlying the two phenomena.
We further speculate that such shared mechanisms operate at the
stage of conceptual processing: there is accumulating evidence that
cross-modal correspondences rely more on cognitive processing at
an abstract conceptual level and perhaps less on mechanisms of
the perceptual system. For instance, the mapping between pitch
and location has been demonstrated to rely on recognition of a
sound’s relative pitch height within a given context rather than
acoustic feature of absolute pitch height (Chiou and Rich, 2012);
the mapping between pitch and size has been found to be seman-
tically mediated (Gallace and Spence, 2006); and the same set
of conceptual regularities seem to guide whether various sensory
attributes form a harmonious combination or not (Walker, 2012;
Walker and Walker, 2012; Walker et al., 2012). Furthermore, the
impact of some cross-modal mappings (e.g., pitch-size; loudness–
brightness) on perceptual judgment has been shown to reﬂect
biases at a post-perceptual decisional level, rather than perceptual-
level phenomena (Marks et al., 2003; Keetels andVroomen, 2011).
Although whether different types of cross-modal mappings differ
in their extent of reliance on “perceptual vs. conceptual” factors
awaits more exploration (for discussion, see Spence, 2011), the
current pattern of results seems to suggest a key role of concepts
in various types of cross-modality correspondences. If synesthesia
builds on these cross-modality mechanisms we all share (as argued
by different research teams; see Ward et al., 2006; Chiou et al.,
2012; Bankieris and Simner, 2013), it should similarly depend on
conceptual processing.
There are also commonalities in the synesthetic mapping
between brightness and magnitude. Cohen Kadosh et al. (2007)
tested individuals with digit-color synesthesia and found the
brightness value of synesthetic color was negatively correlated
with numerical size. This resembles the patterns seen in non-
synesthetes such that brighter color is associated with smaller
numerical size (Kadosh et al., 2005) and physical size (Walker and
Walker, 2012). The similarity of size–brightness mapping for both
abstract (i.e., numbers) and concrete (i.e., physical objects) size is
consistent with these effects arising from a higher-level conceptual
stage.
Finally, the relationship between vision and touch also supports
a conceptual-level relationship that underlies both synesthetic
and non-synesthetic mappings. Two recent studies reported that
non-synesthetic participants matched haptic sensations to visual
FIGURE 2 | Chiou et al. (2012) had synesthetes draw their
synesthetic percepts in response to instrument notes using
graphics software and analyzed how synesthetic visual features
varied with auditory pitch. (A) The relationship between pitch and the
size of synesthetic objects as measured by the number of pixels in the
drawings. (B) The relationship between pitch and the brightness of
synesthetic color, indicated by brightness value (1–100). (C) The
relationship between pitch and the location of synesthetic objects,
indicated by categorical codings of synesthetes’ description. Asterisks
indicate a statistically signiﬁcant correlation (p < 0.05). Note that there
are 20 data-points (2 repetitions by 10 notes) in each ﬁgure, but some
data-points are concealed due to auditory pitch (Hz) being compressed
in logarithmic scale. Redrawn based on Figure 4 of Chiou et al. (2012)
with permission of the publisher.
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features in ways akin to an individual with tactile–visual synes-
thesia. Speciﬁcally Simner and Ludwig (2012; also see Ludwig
and Simner, 2012) studied EB, who experiences synesthetic col-
ors from tactile stimuli. They found that, for EB, smooth, soft,
and round stimuli tended to induce brighter colors, compared
to rough, hard, and spiky stimuli. Similar patterns between touch
and visionwere also found in non-synesthetic participants, despite
them having no conscious color experiences. Moreover, for both
EB andnon-synesthetes, some tactile stimuli seemed to forma reli-
able link with certain colors (e.g., soft stimuli were associated with
pink). The authors interpreted the resemblance as stemming from
shared mechanisms, such as semantic knowledge. For example,
the link between softness and pink might originate from the West-
ern convention of pairing pink color with infancy and femininity,
two traits indirectly associated with softness. Thus, as with other
types of synesthesia, the similarity in underlying patterns between
tactile–visual synesthetes and non-synesthetic individuals is con-
sistent with the involvement of high-level cognitive processes at a
conceptual stage.
The studies reviewed above suggest that synesthesia relies
on mechanisms involving ordinary semantic representations and
abstract concepts, echoing the view that synesthesia may be an
exaggerated form of “normal” cognitive operations (Martino and
Marks, 2001; Ward et al., 2006). In particular, the knowledge
regarding lexicon–color and cross-modality association seems to
mediate the “content” of synesthetic experience (e.g., its hue
or brightness). This suggests that the link between synesthetic
inducer and concurrent is not random and arbitrary but guided
by conceptual knowledge about lexical/semantic properties and
cross-modality relations. In the following section, we review
more evidence showing that conceptualmediation seems a general
principle for other types of synesthesia.
IS CONCEPTUAL MEDIATION A GENERAL MECHANISM FOR
SYNESTHESIA?
As discussed earlier, it has been found that most grapheme–color
synesthetes report experiencing the same synesthetic color regard-
less of the modality (printed or spoken) and format (italic, bold,
or different fonts) in which the inducing stimulus is presented
(Rich et al., 2005). In addition, it has also been found that an
ambiguous graphemic stimulus can induce different synesthetic
colors when interpreted differently (e.g., an ambiguous symbol
can be interpreted as “S” or “5”; Myles et al., 2003; Dixon et al.,
2006). These ﬁndings suggest that grapheme–color synesthesia
relies crucially on the concept of lexical meaning. There are also
some recent reports of novel forms of synesthesia that are com-
pletely conceptual in nature. Nikolic´ et al. (2011) documented two
individuals who report that different swimming styles (breast-
stroke, butterﬂy, backstroke, and front crawl) evoke different
colors. This “swimming-style synesthesia” is determined by con-
ceptual rather than perceptual factors: the same color is elicited
no matter whether the synesthete is receiving proprioceptive feed-
back during swimming, performing motor imagery of swimming
action, or even just seeing the photos of swimming posture. The
determinant of color seems to be the concept of swimming style
with little impact of perceptual factors. Such observations led the
authors to dub the phenomenon “ideasthesia” and propose that it
is the “idea”of the inducer that triggers synesthetic colors (Jürgens
and Nikolic´, 2012; Mroczko-Wasowicz and Werning, 2012).
The claim that conceptual mediation is critical for synesthe-
sia seems incompatible with a recent study showing that letters
with similar shapes evoke similar synesthetic colors (Brang et al.,
2011). These authors interpreted this ﬁnding as neurons coding
graphemic features activating those coding chromatic sensations
in the contiguousV4, hence synesthetic color being an outcome of
low-level neural wiring. Another recent study, however, showed
that exactly the same result could be explained by high-level
conceptual mechanisms: Jürgens and Nikolic´ (2012) trained 20
German synesthetes to learn artiﬁcially created graphemic sym-
bols for 10–15 min and asked them to report whether these
symbols evoked colors after training. Results of subjective reports
showed that these pseudo graphemes were able to provoke color
experience (also see Mroczko et al., 2009 in which the authors
demonstrated rapid transfer of synesthetic colors to novel sym-
bols using an objective congruency effect in a color naming task).
Critically, these new “graphemes” tended to “inherit” synesthetic
colors from German letters that were similar in shape. As it only
took minutes to form the novel associations between “graphemes”
and colors, the authors suggest that such a timeframe would be
too rapid for the formation of new neural cross-wiring to occur.
Instead, the result is more likely to be driven by high-level concep-
tual processing that guides the choices and creation of synesthetic
colors. In our view, this implies similar mechanisms may oper-
ate during language acquisition in early childhood such that a
synesthete may learn a new grapheme based on its visual simi-
larity to a grapheme learnt earlier, which consequently affects its
synesthetic color. For example, if “O” is learnt ﬁrst and associ-
ated with lime green, “Q” may be initially learnt as “O with a
stroke” and inherit the synesthetic color from “O”; as “Q” grad-
ually develops its graphemic individuality, its lime green color
may turn into another color with similar hue, such as olive green.
Although speculative, this conceptual account may also explain
why similarly shaped letters of the ﬁrst and second language
tend to induce similar colors (Rich et al., 2005; Barnett et al.,
2009).
In addition to the types of synesthesia reviewed above, concepts
have also been found to mediate “lexical-gustatory synesthesia,”
in which words are associated with tastes (e.g., the word “cas-
tanets” elicits the taste of tuna). In an elegant demonstration,
Simner andWard (2006) presented images of objects that are rarely
encountered in daily life (e.g., a platypus) and had six lexical-
gustatory synesthetes perform picture naming. As the objects
were uncommon, sometimes participants experienced the“tip-of-
tongue” (TOT) phenomenon in which they recognized the object
and knew many of its properties but just failed to retrieve the
name. When TOT occurred, the experimenter then questioned
the participant further about the word’s phonology (to ensure
that the participant could not retrieve any information about con-
stituent letters or the number of syllables) and asked synesthetes
to report the synesthetic taste. After the naming task, the experi-
menter read aloud the names of objects and asked synesthetes to
indicate their synesthetic tastes again. The key result was that in
the state of complete TOT (i.e., neither name nor any phonologi-
cal or lexical piece could be retrieved) synesthetes sometimes still
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reported experiencing tastes, and the reported tastes matched with
the tastes they had subsequently when hearing the objects’ names.
Simner and Ward (2006) suggest that thinking of a word’s mean-
ing is sufﬁcient to trigger synesthetic tastes, occurring even in the
absence of access to any lexical or phonological code. Togetherwith
other types of synesthesia, the overall pattern of evidence seems
to indicate that the key stage of the information processing stream
at which synesthetic percepts arise is the activation of concept.
By contrast, stages upstream (e.g., perceptual analysis) or down-
stream (e.g., lemma or phonology) to the concept/meaning of
the inducer do not seem essential for the elicitation of synesthetic
experiences.
Having considered the behavioral evidence showing the key
role of conceptual knowledge in mediating synesthesia, in the next
section we turn to the brain, discussing what neural structures
are potential substrates for conceptual mediation. We focus espe-
cially on the neural representations of object color knowledge,
and the predictions our conceptual-mediation model makes for
the regions involved in synesthesia beyond V4.
THE ROLE OF THE ANTERIOR TEMPORAL LOBES IN REPRESENTING
OBJECT COLOR KNOWLEDGE AND GRAPHEME–COLOR SYNESTHESIA
There is good evidence that the anterior temporal lobe (ATL)
serves as a core substrate in the neural architecture for concep-
tual/semantic knowledge (Patterson et al., 2007; for review, also see
LambonRalph andPatterson, 2008).Various lines of inquiry using
neuropsychological and neuroimaging approaches have shown
that theATLmediates conceptual processing for a variety of stimuli
(words, images, sounds, odors, etc.). This has led to the “hub-and-
spoke”model of conceptual representation,where theATL acts as a
“hub” that works in tandem with modality-speciﬁc areas (spokes)
to integrate various perceptually based content into a meaningful
conceptual entity (Patterson et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph and Pat-
terson, 2008). As illustrated in Figure 3, for example, the concept
of a banana as an edible food that is yellow in color and curvy in
shape requires the concerted operation of modality-based regions
processing color, shape, motor information, and the ATL con-
structing more abstract concepts about “banana,” “edibility,” and
“food.” One fMRI study of synesthesia and a recent neurostimu-
lation study of ordinary color knowledge together give hints that
synesthetic color experience may recruit a portion of the ATL that
also underpins typical conceptual memory of object–color associ-
ations. This preliminary neural evidence, in combination with the
previously reviewed behavioral results showing that synesthetic
color resembles color memory and relies upon semantic represen-
tation, lead us to speculate that there is a role for the ATL in the
neural substrate of synesthesia.
Could the ATL be a key neural structure in synesthesia? We
propose that, based on the behavioral evidence of conceptual pro-
cessing being important in synesthesia, and on the role the ATL
plays in normal object knowledge, it could be a key component
of the neural substrates that give rise to synesthesia. At this point,
there are a few hints in the published literature and recent work
from our own laboratory supporting such a speculation. First, van
Leeuwen et al. (2010) reported an fMRI exploration in which, in
one of many analyses, synesthetic color appeared to recruit a por-
tion of the right ATL. In an initial experiment, these researchers
FIGURE 3 | A schematic representation of how the (much simplified)
concept of a banana as an edible food with its distinct color and shape
could be represented in the “hub-and-spoke” framework (Patterson
et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph and Patterson, 2008). In this model, various
perceptually based attributes are coded in their respective modality-speciﬁc
regions (spokes) for perception and action (i.e., color: V4; shape: lateral
occipital cortex, LOC; associated action of biting: motor-related regions
lying along the precentral gyrus; linguistic label: superior temporal sulcus,
STS). There may be interconnections among these regions, as indexed by
gray thin lines. Crucially, these attributes are connected to (shown as thick
maroon lines), and communicate through, an amodal (or supramodal)
“hub” in the (possibly bilateral) anterior temporal lobes (ATLs). At the hub
stage, different sources of sensory and motoric features coalesce to form
abstract meaning. Note that this is a simpliﬁed representation of the
typically intricate connections of a semantic network.
analyzed brain activation in 19 synesthetes and 19 controls within
an occipitotemporal ROI to identify areas that were sensitive to
real and synesthetic colors. In a second experiment, they then
tested the two groups using a repetition suppression experiment
to explore where neurons responded to actual color (i.e., a phys-
ically colored square; target) as if it was the same as a previously
presented synesthetic color (i.e., a color-inducing achromatic
grapheme; prime). The authors hypothesized that there would
be a drop in neural activation in the color-sensitive areas (V4,
delimited based on the localization results from the ﬁrst experi-
ment) when the prime (synesthetic color) and the following target
(real color) were of the same hue relative to different hues. The
predicted effect would mean that synesthetic colors are coded by
the color center V4, but instead the results showed no suppression
effect of synesthetic color in any of the pre-deﬁned color-sensitive
ROIs of the visual cortex. Subsequent analyses of brain regions
outside the color-selective ROIs, however, found repetition sup-
pression in synesthetes in the right ATL and the hippocampus,
two areas crucial for memory formation and conceptual knowl-
edge (Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998; LambonRalph et al., 2009).
The authors concluded that synesthetic color does not fully share a
neural basis with real color and is represented by high-level cortical
areas beyond the scope of the visual cortex, such as those involved
in memory. Note, however, that the neural suppression effect of
synesthesia was obtained using planned tests in the absence of
a signiﬁcant interaction involving the group factor (synesthetes
vs. controls). Such results must therefore be treated cautiously,
but they do provide tantalizing hints that synesthetic color may
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be represented in brain areas involved in high-level functions of
semantic memory.
The involvement of the ATL in representing conceptual knowl-
edge (Patterson et al., 2007), and the possible repetition sup-
pression effect in this region of synesthetic brains (van Leeuwen
et al., 2010), give an (admittedly preliminary) basis for a plausible
cognitive-neural model in which synesthesia relies on “normal”
mechanisms for conceptual knowledge. A critical step for such
a model is ﬁrst to demonstrate that this region mediates the
conceptual associations between objects and canonical colors in
non-synesthetes. We recently tested this hypothesis by disrupting
the neural processing in the ATL using continuous theta-burst
stimulation (cTBS, a high-frequency form of transcranial mag-
netic stimulation, TMS) to explore whether the ATL is necessary
for integrating typical color with object shape and name (Chiou
et al., in press). In separate experimental sessions, we disrupted
neural processing of either the left ATL or a control site (the occip-
ital pole) in eight non-synesthetic participants. In each session,
participants named images of different objects with characteris-
tic colors; the objects were presented in either their typical or an
atypical color, which results in a color congruency effect (e.g.,
faster object recognition/naming of a yellow banana than a purple
banana). Participants also performed a control task that required
naming the amount of numbers in an array, where the element
digit could be congruent or incongruent with the total amount
(e.g., 333 or 555). This task produces a congruency effect that does
not involve conceptual integration but is driven by conﬂicts in lex-
ical retrieval. The critical result is that ATL stimulation abolished
the otherwise robust color congruency effect but had no impact
on the numerical effect, indicating a selective disruption of object
color knowledge. Neither color nor numerical congruency effects
were affected by stimulation at the control occipital site, ruling out
alternative explanations of TMS disrupting any congruency-type
effect in a non-speciﬁc manner. This result suggests that the ATL
plays a key role in mediating the coupling between objects and
their canonical colors.
We speculate that the neural computation performed by the
ATL to link object concepts to canonical colors may be analo-
gous to that involved in linking inducer concepts to synesthetic
colors. When synesthetic color becomes strongly bound to the
concept of an inducer (e.g., letter), it becomes a feature or
attribute of that inducer, which shares characteristics with typ-
ical conceptual knowledge about semantics and cross-modality
relations. This would explain why synesthesia is unaffected by
early perceptual mechanisms (e.g., brightness contrast, chro-
matic adaptation, etc.), shares systematic patterns with normal
cross-modality correspondences, and is inﬂuenced by high-order
cognitive factors (e.g., identiﬁcation of meaning, contextual inter-
pretation, lexical/semantic relationship with other conceptual
entities, etc.).
If the ATL is crucial for synesthesia, why have we not seen
activation in this region in neuroimaging studies of synesthesia?
There are clear methodological reasons why this may be the case.
First, a recent meta-analysis has suggested that the absence of
the ATL activation may reﬂect technical limitations of magnetic
resonance imaging (Visser et al., 2010b). Speciﬁcally, images of
the ATL are usually distorted due to ﬁeld inhomogeneity around
the air-ﬁlled cavities near the ATL (Devlin et al., 2000), hence
leading to substantial signal dropout. In addition, many neu-
roimaging studies have limited coverage of the temporal lobe
due to a restricted ﬁeld of view (FOV) during data acquisi-
tion. According to Visser et al. (2010b), the inferior section
of the ATL is often not included when the FOV is narrower
than 15 cm. The second major contributing factor to the lack
of ATL activation is the prevalent use of ROI approach: with
the aim to test whether synesthesia activates color-sensitive area
V4, and to maximize power in the often small samples, it is
common for synesthesia studies to conﬁne the analyses to the
ventral occipitotemporal areas, ignoring other brain regions.
Together, the lack of ATL activation is likely to reﬂect an absence
of evidence rather than an evidence of absence. Some recent
papers have shown that with distortion-corrected techniques that
prevent signals of the ATL from degradation, ATL activity is reli-
ably observed when participants retrieve conceptual knowledge
(Binney et al., 2010; Visser et al., 2010a; Visser and Lambon Ralph,
2011).We thereforemay yet see studies demonstrating the involve-
ment of the ATL in synesthesia if the technical issues concerning
dropout are taken into account in experimental design and data
acquisition.
It is worth noting that the possible repetition suppression
reported by vanLeeuwen et al. (2010)was in the right ATL,whereas
Chiou et al. (in press) stimulated the left ATL. There is evidence
showing that the bilateral ATLs contribute equally to conceptual
processing, no matter whether the stimuli are graphemic or picto-
rial (LambonRalph et al., 2009; Pobric et al., 2010; but seeGainotti,
2012). It is possible that TMS to the left ATL can generate some
subtle effects on the right ATL, through connections to homolo-
gous regions (e.g., Schambra et al., 2003; although note that here
the contralateral effect is based on the excitability of themotor cor-
tex, whether this is generalizable to the ATL remains unknown).
Alternatively, there may be a hemispherical difference between the
left and right ATL in representing synesthetic color and object
color knowledge.
It is important to stress that we are not suggesting that synes-
thetic experience ismerely conceptual association,mental imagery,
or metaphoric thinking. Synesthesia is elicited involuntarily by
a recognized inducer and is experienced as a conscious per-
cept, two diagnostic features making it distinct from voluntary
imagery and ordinary conceptual knowledge. Nonetheless, the
psychophysical similarity between synesthetic color and object
color memory, alongside the possible involvement of the concept-
related ATLs, suggest that the ostensibly perceptual synesthetic
experience requires critical non-perceptual mechanisms linking
inducers and concurrents. Additional mechanisms, however, may
still be necessary to enable a synesthetic link between inducers
and concurrents to emerge as a conscious percept in a person’s
subjective experience. The key mechanisms that make synes-
thetic experience less intentional than, and thus distinct from,
other concept-related phenomena (e.g., cross-modal mappings,
typical color knowledge, etc.) may lie in the broad neural struc-
tures that subserve attention and feature integration, including
the parietal lobe (Taylor, 2001; Laureys, 2005). Exploring the
dynamics between the ATLs and parietal regions will be crucial
for developing our neurocognitive conceptual-mediation model
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of synesthesia. In the following section, we raise some testable
predictions.
SOME TESTABLE HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE ATL IN
SYNESTHESIA
We propose that the ATL is a critical node in the neural network
underpinning the conceptual mediation observed in synesthesia
(see Figure 4), reﬂecting the accumulating evidence of the impor-
tance of identiﬁcation of meaning and conceptual modulation.
The ATL serves as a “hub” that mediates conceptual integration
between inducer meaning and its associated concurrent. After
the sensory cortices perform the initial analysis of the inducer’s
perceptual properties (e.g., visual word form or acoustic features
of a sound), the processing stream feeds into the ATL, which
functions as a repository for a myriad of high-level conceptual
attributes. Neural activity in the ATL underpins the conceptual
entity of the inducer and allows access to associated conceptual
attributes. Analogous to its role in the ordinary conceptual inte-
gration between objects and typical colors (Rogers et al., 2007;
Hoffman et al., 2012; also see Chiou et al., in press), we propose
that the ATL also mediates the connection between synesthetic
inducers and concurrents. Note that although the outcome of this
connection is anomalous (i.e., a conscious experience not present
in non-synesthetes), weak versions of this link presumably also
exist in non-synesthetes, leading to implicit associations.
It should be emphasized that the ATL performs the integra-
tion at a conceptual (or supramodal) level. Namely, it combines
FIGURE 4 |The outer cortical surface with proposed regions involved
in the neural substrates of grapheme–color synesthesia under the
conceptual-mediation model. The anterior temporal lobe (ATL) is
indicated in magenta. In our model, the ATL functions as a representational
“hub” that processes lexical meaning and associates the lexicon to
synesthetic color representation at an abstract, conceptual level. The
color-related area of the posterior ventral temporal cortex is indicated in
green. This cortical region contains the fusiform gyrus (V4) and the lingual
gyrus. In our model, this area serves as a “spoke” that processes the
subjective experience of synesthetic color and may not overlap with the
neural basis of real color experience. The posterior parietal lobe is indicated
in blue. This region mediates the attention-related functions in synesthesia,
such as directing voluntary attention to an inducer or binding graphemes
with color at a perceptual level, akin to its role in the typical function of
binding various visual attributes (color, shape, location, etc.) of an object.
the meaning of the inducer with an abstract concept of the con-
current that may be devoid of perceptual content (e.g., letter “A”
is red in color or middle C is metallic gray – linking perhaps in
a propositional/symbolic manner). To gain access to the embod-
ied/phenomenological content of synesthetic experiences, theATL
“hub”needs to work in tandem with cortical regions (spokes) that
are adjacent to (but may not overlap with) those subserving per-
ceptual features, hence a distributed coding pattern that involves
(at least) dual sites. In the case of synesthetic color, for example,
the “spoke” may be the left medial lingual gyrus, an area close to
the typical anatomical locus of human V4 and has been reported
to be activated by retrieval of object color knowledge (Chao and
Martin, 1999) and synesthetic color (Rich et al., 2006). Although
synesthetic color may recruit “spoke”areas of the broad perceptual
cortices (e.g., the lingual gyrus), it does not necessarily require this
to be the same core cortical sites as those coding the wavelength
of real color (e.g., V4/the posterior fusiform gyrus), which could
explain the documented differences between actual and synes-
thetic colors. That is, the “spoke” representation of synesthetic
color may be coded in the vicinity of but does not necessarily
overlap withV4. Furthermore, we suspect that the individual vari-
ability in the salience of synesthetic color may lie in the “strength”
with which the ATL “hub” connects with the color-related “spoke”
(i.e., how far and persistently the neural activation travels). In
synesthetes who see vivid lexically induced colors, there may be
reliable feedback signals of the ATL reaching to and activating
the broad color-related visual cortices. By contrast, in synes-
thetes who feel color, the neural activation may not perpetuate
through to the perceptual cortices – they may even stay within
the scope of the ATL. Note these are just examples; the range
of synesthetic experience seems to us to be a continuum, not a
dichotomy.
In addition to the “hub-and-spoke” system that amalgamates
inducers with concurrents, the elicitation of synesthetic expe-
riences also requires the parietal lobe. Based on the strong
involvement of the posterior parietal lobe in attention (Donner
et al., 2002), its contribution to synesthesia is typically interpreted
as a facilitation of attentional binding between grapheme and
color (Esterman et al., 2006; Muggleton et al., 2007). However,
there are two possible (not mutually exclusive) roles for the pari-
etal lobe in synesthesia: ﬁrst, it has a domain-general function
in that it works as a part of the fronto-parietal cognitive con-
trol system that prioritizes stimuli and directs voluntary attention
to an entity pertinent to synesthetic experience, such as a color-
inducing digit. Second, it has a domain-speciﬁc function that it
acts as “glue” that binds inducer and concurrent into a united
whole. The second function of the parietal lobe may convert
the content of a synesthetic concurrent into a conscious experi-
ence,making it more vivid than ordinary conceptual knowledge of
color.
The strength of the model outlined above is that it generates
speciﬁc predictions and is testable (and thus falsiﬁable). A straight-
forward prediction is that disrupting the neuronal activity of the
ATL will lead to a breakdown of the conceptual coupling between
synesthetic inducers and concurrents. This disruptive effect should
occur in any type of synesthesia that involves conceptual associ-
ation. Therefore, although auditory–visual and grapheme–color
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synesthesia involve different inducing stimuli and recruit distinct
brain regions for initial perceptual processing, TMS to the ATL
should disrupt both types of synesthesia if they both rely on the
conceptual integration executed by the ATL. It is noteworthy that
this predicted TMS effect of the ATL might disrupt distinct pro-
cesses from the disruption caused by TMS to posterior parietal
regions. Whereas TMS to the parietal areas may impair the atten-
tional processes involved in conscious synesthetic percepts, TMS
to the ATL should cause disruption at a stage prior to the involve-
ment of parietal mechanisms – the conceptual coding of inducers
and their conceptual link to concurrents.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we review evidence demonstrating the critical con-
tribution of conceptual representations in synesthesia. There are
some claims that synesthesia may involve low-level visual mecha-
nisms and acts like the color experience caused by the wavelength
of light. The weight of evidence, however, suggests that synesthesia
relies on high-level cognitive processes, such as identiﬁcation of
lexical meaning, and behaves distinctly from real color in terms of
its psychophysical properties. Furthermore, neuroimaging investi-
gations have failed to ﬁnd consistent activation of the core cortical
substrate of color vision (V4) when an individual experiences
synesthetic color, consistent with the suggestion that cortical areas
beyond the scope of the early perceptual system may be crucial.
We suggest that the data call for a re-evaluation of the current neu-
rocognitive models of synesthesia, which assume that synesthesia
is a perceptual phenomenon. Based on recent behavioral and neu-
ral evidence, we speculate that the synesthetic mapping between
inducers and concurrents may be analogous to the typical concep-
tual mapping between objects and their perceptual attributes. This
conceptualization of synesthesia is compatible with recent reports
that synesthetic color experience is akin to color memory. It also
better explains the strikingly similar trends of non-synesthetic
individuals to synesthetes. In a broader sense, we believe this
framework can potentially inform us how the high-level cognitive
system shapes our conscious experience of the world.
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